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I. Introduction:  
Energy issues have always been at the heart of 
European integration, nonetheless, energy 
related topics (such as climate change policy, 
renewable energies, energy planning, energy 
security of supply, etc…) have only gained 
growing importance (also in the very 
quantitative sense of the word) on the EU’s 
policy and regulation agenda following the 
evident “environmentalisation” of Energy law 
under the auspices of sustainability2.   This 
paper gives an overview of how this particular 
field of policy action shows why the EU’s legal 
system is profoundly affected by paradoxes and 
hurdles hampering the effective enhancement of 
an internal energy market and a strong EU 
sustainability governance despite of the 
existence of a strong constitutional setting 
advocating for it. The EU regulatory framework 
for Member States to reach the same direction 
towards the energy transition and decarbonised 
economy is following different speeds 
according to uncoordinated national policy 
decisions. This, of course, puts at risk the whole 
European integration process and the integrity 
of a solid Energy market that has taken a new 
resilient direction towards energy regulation by 
setting capacity mechanisms of decentralized 
nature for security reasons.  
We understand that Energy and Environmental 
policy, originally perceived as separate 
competences, are now two faces of the same 
coin. Energy is one of the most important pillars 
of the “sacred temple”3 of sustainability. Still, 
while there is an agreeing understanding 
towards the consideration of the Treaty of 
                                                          
2 I. Solorio, Mischa Bechberger, Lucia Popartan, “The 
European Energy Policy and its ‘Green Dimension’: 
Discursive Hegemony and Policy Variations in the Greening 
of Energy Policy” in, P. Barnes and T. Hoerber (eds), 
Sustainable development and Governance in Europe, 
Routledge (2013). 
3 Recalling the words of Vaughan Lowe “Sustainable 
development…is clearly entitled to a place in the Pantheon 
of concepts that are 
not to be questioned in polite company, along with 
democracy, human rights and the 
sovereign equality of states…”, in “Sustainable 
Development and Unsustainable Arguments”, in Alan Boyle 
and David Freestone (eds.) International Law and 
Sustainable Development. Past Achievements and Future 
Challenges (OUP 1999), 30-31. 
Lisbon as a “milestone” towards further EU 
integration on line with Sustainability goals 
setting a new paradigm of action, there is 
perhaps not such an approach as to the question 
of attaining a satisfactory answer towards more 
specific questions regarding the use of natural 
resources and energy supply under a more 
coordinated line of action. Nonetheless the past 
decade has seen intensive legislative activity in 
the field of European energy policy. Three 
legislative packages aiming at the promotion of 
competition and of a number of non-economic 
objectives, such as security of supply and 
environmental sustainability, have been 
implemented.  Courts have also been active 
developing matters regarding national support 
schemes for renewables and security of supply, 
without attaining the issue of sustainability and 
the integration of the European energy market 
that should be at the heart of this topics.  
The specific energy provision introduced by 
article 194 into the Treaty on the Functioning of 
European Union (from now onwards TFEU) in 
2009, being fairly a new provision welcoming a 
shared new EU competence on energy policy, 
security of supply and introducing the principle 
of solidarity between MS still raises doubts and 
concerns about future developments in the field 
of energy4. What is clear since 2009 is that the 
European Parliament and the Council have 
adopted a significant number of regulations and 
directives related to a myriad of aspects of 
energy policy without signs of slowing down. It 
has become a complicated legal field with an 
intensive and sometimes uncoordinated 
legislative production. These facts, demonstrate 
the growing importance attributed to the Union 
Policy on energy that could have helped to 
emphasise the desire of MS to face the 
challenges in the field of energy with a common 
response at European level. But there are certain 
signs pointing towards a different direction. 
Moreover, the “[s]pirit of solidarity” proclaimed 
by Article 194(1)(b) TFEU is somehow 
overlooked.     
Our analyses is not just concerned with the 
transformation process of the energy market 
                                                          
4 See, Johnston, Angus, Van der Marel, E. “Ad Lucem? 
Interpreting the New Energy Provision, and in particular the 
Meaning of Article 194 (2) TFEU” in European Energy and 
Environmental Law Review, October, 2013, pp. 181 et seg. 
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into a liberalised single market which allows for 
competition across the borders. What is more 
essentially important to us is that, the whole EU 
constitutional framework advocating for 
sustainability and integration in different policy 
areas is at risk precisely because of one of its 
cornerstones, the energy market. The energy 
market seems to be the heart of the EU 
constitutional setting critical aspects. Let’s 
admit that the ambitious EU’s climate policy 
and the EU leadership on the sustainability 
governance is in contrast with the complexities 
of the internal energy market. It is still rather 
underdeveloped, regardless of the abused 
existence of the term “sustainability” within the 
enormous block of legal instruments advocating 
for it.  
Furthermore, the CJEU following the 
controversial decisions of Essent Belgium and 
Ålands Vindkraft does not seem to be willing to 
give encouragements to complete the energy 
market. There are also signs of overcoming 
considering the differences on MS’ capacity to 
manage climate change issues added to the 
difficulties of addressing the EU integrated 
policy on matters of Energy security under the 
recent crisis between Russia and Ukraine pose 
additional challenges5. Thus, many 
sustainability aims are being contradicted by the 
EU’s own single European Market6.  Here is 
where the ‘EU constitutional concerns’ firmly 
established by the Lisbon Treaty should play an 
important role if we want to shape the future of 
our energy and environmental policy under the 
“sustainability” paradigm. In Europe 
sustainability fits in within traditional categories 
of normativity, and this contribution seeks to 
show how it operates in the current EU legal 
framework.  
II. Successful Environmental 
Governance 
Our first premise starts by ascertaining how the 
EU is quite a unique successful experiment in 
regional environmental governance, especially 
after having seen the lack of such governance at 
international and global level. This is widely 
                                                          
5 Recent reports addressing EU energy policy have 
identified that the issues concerning security of supply have 
not been adequately taken into account, particularly because 
the EU institutions have remained “much too focused on 
sustainable development”. The Ukrainian crises of 2009 and 
2014 and the most recent one this winter covering 2015 and 
2016, did however prompt the EU to examine in depth and 
seriously address the issues of security of external supply. 
On this point see, Sami Andoura and Jean-Arnold Vinois, 
foreword by Jacques Delors, “From the European Energy 
Community to the Energy Union – A Policy Proposal for the 
Short and Long Term”, Studies & Reports No. 107, Jacques 
Delors Institute, January 2015. 
6 For a good overview on the above mentioned 
contradictions see, Armin Steinbach, R. Bruckmann, 
"Renewable Energy and the Free-movement of Goods", (27) 
Journal of Environmental Law, 2015. 
accepted7. On the top of this, for some it is 
noticeable how for “over 50 years the EU 
member states have noted the advantages to be 
gained by incrementally transferring sovereign 
rights to a supranational level”8, of course the 
obvious advantage of this is that member states 
coordinate their efforts, through legislation and 
centralised decision-making that has important 
enforcement mechanisms. Therefore to this end, 
the EU provides an exemplary model of 
governance for sustainability and the past years 
have seen an intensive legislative activity in the 
field of energy integrating environmental and 
Climate Change governance9. In fact, one of the 
most prominent aspects of EU environmental 
policy in this phase remain however the actions 
and initiatives in response to climate change 
defined in the Sixth EAP as the “outstanding 
Challenge of the next 10 years and Beyond”. A 
related side-effect of the growing prominence 
and autonomy acquired by the EU climate 
policy is its progressive detachment from the 
                                                          
7 “[W]ith the exception of regional systems, such as the EU, 
international environmental law still suffers from a serious 
deficit of enforcement mechanism”,  
8 Bosselman, The principle of Sustainability, p.187.  
9 Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable sources; Regulation (EC) No 
663/2009 establishing a programme to aid economic 
recovery by granting Community financial assistance to 
projects in the field of energy, as amended by Regulation 
(EU) No 1233/2010; Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation on Energy 
Regulators; Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the 
use of energy from renewable sources; Regulation (EC) No 
663/2009 establishing a programme to aid economic 
recovery by granting Community financial assistance to 
projects in the field of energy, as amended by Regulation 
(EU) No 1233/2010; Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 
establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators; Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 on conditions for 
access to the network for cross-border exchanges in 
electricity; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 on conditions for 
access to the natural gas transmission networks; Directive 
2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal 
market in electricity; Directive 2009/73/EC concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas; 
Directive 2009/119/EC imposing an obligation on Member 
States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or 
petroleum products; Directive 2009/125/EC establishing a 
framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for 
energy-related products; Regulation (EC) No 1222/2009 on 
the labelling of tyres with respect to fuel efficiency and 
other essential parameters; Directive 2010/30/EU on the 
indication by labelling and standard product information of 
the consumption of energy and other resources by energy-
related products; Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy 
performance of buildings; Regulation (EU) No 617/2010 
concerning the notification to the Commission of investment 
projects in energy infrastructure; Regulation (EU) No 
994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard  
security of gas supply; Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 on 
wholesale energy market integrity and transparency 
(REMIT); Directive on Energy Efficiency (2012/27/EU); 
Directive to reduce indirect land use change for biofuels and 
bioliquids (EU 2015/1513). Of course this is not an 
exhaustive list. There is also work in progress for a new 
directive on Renewables for the period after 2020.  
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field of environmental policy (culminating with 
the creation of a separate Directorate). At the 
same time the new energy title introduces 
explicitly an environmental dimension in the 
pursuit of EU Energy policies, and given the 
increasing prominence of energy issues in the 
EU, the specific reference to environmental and 
climate change objectives in the Energy title is 
certainly a positive step towards promoting the 
integration of environmental concerns with 
other key policy areas10. 
The evolution of EU environmental law and 
policy since the 1960 shows how the European 
project has remarkably expanded from the 
specific economic sphere of market integration 
to address new social challenges under the 
sustainability paradigm11. Still, the 
intensification of legislative and policy 
initiatives aimed at strengthening the linkages 
between energy and climate change objectives 
within the framework of an integrated energy 
market has some remarkable weaknesses.  
Difficulties may arise, of course, due to the EU 
enlargement and their different geopolitical 
conditions (especially those concerned with the 
exploitation of their natural resources and the 
importation of energy), the number of European 
states subject to EU policy on sustainable 
development has grown to 28 member states12 
and this means that greater economic integration 
within the EU and between the EU and other 
European states has increased the impact of that 
policy. The enlarged EU has gained an 
enhanced role and reputation in international 
conventions and negotiations relating to 
sustainability and sustainable development. But 
still, what challenges remain at the forefront? 
III. EU’s Energy Policy at the 
crossroads of Environmental 
Protection Law. The Hegemonic 
presence of Sustainability in the 
EU Governance model.  
The Europeanisation of Energy law with the 
footprint of sustainability should provide long 
lasting provisions and help MS to develop green 
                                                          
10 According to E. Orlando, “The Evolution of EU Policy 
and law in the Environmental field: Achievements and 
Current Challenges” in Bakker, Francioni, The EU, The US 
and Global Climate Governance, Routledge, 2014, p.74. 
11 E. Ostrom, “Polycentric systems for coping with 
collective action and global environmental change”, in 
Global Environmental Change, vol.20, Issue 4, October 
2010, pp.550-557. 
 
12 We are witnessing a historical moment for Europe after 
the results of the British referendum to leave the EU. Article 
50 of the TFEU regulating the process of leaving the EU has 
never been applied before. The EU has only grown. This is 
the first time Europe is facing the situation by which one of 
its member states decides to exit. See further comments on 
this argument, Paul P. Craig, “Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts”, 
European Law Review (2016). 
economies easier and faster that should happen 
in other parts of the world. Thus, the European 
Union with energy rules set at the European 
level; and energy policy with a clear ecological 
core could illustrate an increasing 
Europeanisation process and a unique 
governance model towards sustainability. The 
EU is the world’s only region where sustainable 
development combining economic, social and 
environmental policies is declared a 
‘constitutional objective’. 
As we have mentioned MS coordinate their 
efforts through legislation and centralised 
decision-making fostering an administrative 
system that has been perceived “as a trustee of 
the regional interest”13 concerning 
environmental, social and economic matters. 
The adoption of sustainability norms into the 
EU by the Fifth Environment Action 
Programme (EAP) and the Amsterdam Treaty 
on the European Union represent the two 
ground-breaking steps towards what it will be 
its constitutinalisation with the Lisbon Treaty. 
The objective of the fifth EAP was to transform 
patterns of growth within the EU community to 
promote sustainability but the innovative part of 
it was its departure from a ‘comand-and-
control’ approach in favor of ‘shared 
responsibility between various actors: 
government, industry and the public’14. It 
followed the sixth EAP noting concerns 
regarding the lack of willingness of member 
states to implement the fifth EAP. Therefore, in 
response to this concern the sixth EAP 
advocated ‘a more inclusive approach including 
more specific targets and an increased use of 
market-based measures’ strengthening 
integration of environmental concerns into other 
policies15.  
As we will see further below EU’s integration 
of sustainability norms are promoted by the 
specific provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty 
(Article 6 and Article 3)16 granting quasi-
constitutional status to the idea of sustainability. 
The formulation contained in the Amsterdam 
Treaty is the basis of the current constitutional 
                                                          
13 G. Winter, “Introduction”, in G. Winter (ed.), Multilevel 
Governance and Global Environmental Change 
(Cambridge, CUP), 2006, p. 24.  
14 See, ‘Fifth European Community Environment 
Programme: Towards Sustainability’ available at 
<http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/128062.htm> 
15 According to K. Bosselman, ‘Missing the Point? The 
EU’s Institutional and Procedural Approach to 
Sustainability’, in M. Pallemaert and A. Azmanova (eds), 
The European Union and Sustainable Development: 
Internal and External Dimensions, Kluwer, 2006, 
pp.105,110,111. See also, ‘Sixth Environment Action 
Programme, Environment 2010: Our future, Our Choice’, 
available at 
<http:Europa.eu.int/comm/environment/newprg> 
16 Currently articles 3 and 11 subsequently. See further text 
of the Amsterdam Treaty 1997. 
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setting. Still what emerges from a thorough 
analyses is that a common-framework of action 
is essentially needed in such delicate topic, 
especially when it comes to the issue of the 
energy market. One could say that the future of 
the EU is at stake on its energy policy. Given 
today’s challenges on energy security of supply, 
climate change and biodiversity conservation, 
with the growing awareness towards an 
equitable allocation of resources, sustainable 
development perceived as a new constitutional 
paradigm is even more essential as part of our 
regulatory frameworks than when the concept 
was coined in the 1987. Not by chance, 
environmental Policy has progressively 
integrated energy policy through the 
‘hegemonic’ presence of ‘sustainability’ before 
Climate Change policy made its outstanding 
appearance in Member States legal scenario.  
It is surely the discourse on sustainability that 
has structured the process of ‘greening’ the EU 
energy policy and has completed the operational 
process of energy and environmental integration 
initiated by the Cardiff process in 1998. The so-
called Cardiff process gave effective departure 
to the founding principle of environmental 
integration that should stand at the core of the 
principle of sustainability and so guide 
European Energy policy17.  Still, it was not a 
successful process that has ever come to an end 
and many concerns are still unresolved.  In fact, 
recent debates on Energy Policy point up to the 
common concern of Member States with long-
term energy supply in Europe, so that recent 
interventions are driven by encouragement on 
investment in generation capacity, offering an 
additional revenue stream for conventional 
power plants in addition to the existing heavily 
subsidised investments in renewable energy 
                                                          
17 As a background we should draw our attention to 1998 
and the Cardiff process, for being this one the first step of an 
unfinished process of integration and institutionalization of 
Environmental policy. In 1998 the Cardiff European 
Council welcomed the Commission’s Strategy for 
integrating environmental concerns and sustainable 
development in other policy areas, considering transport, 
energy and agriculture sectors for the first wave of this 
process. Since then the process of greening EU energy 
policy has never stopped, and the discourse on sustainability 
has somehow structured such process. The Lisbon Strategy 
followed and it went for a further integration commitment 
bringing about economic, social and environmental renewal 
in the EU. This Strategy policy integration will consist on 
bringing alongside environmental and social policies that 
ensure sustainable development and social inclusion. Further 
along, in 2001, the European Council adopted the EU 
Sustainable Development Strategy, combining dynamic 
economy with social cohesion and high environmental 
standards. See, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/environment.html?root_defa
ult=SUM_1_CODED%3D20,SUM_2_CODED%3D2003&l
ocale=en  
sources18. This is just one single flow of the 
capacity remuneration mechanisms emerging 
from the European regulatory debate, but it is 
also a very important indicator of how things 
are taking a sort of a “more conservative” 
leadership leaving aside the ‘sustainability’ 
criteria, whilst it is already acknowledged that 
European energy policy is driven by different 
factors, many of which are global and therefore 
outside the control of the EU’s policy-makers19.   
IV. Some concerns regarding 
“sustainability” as a 
constitutional paradigm of the 
EU. 
European Constitutionalisation (within the EU 
never-ending process of integration), have 
profoundly affected the EU’s legal system as 
well as MS legal systems. What it seems to be 
more unresolved at community level concerns 
the justiciability of new and crucial guiding 
principles that should lie behind public policies 
striving for sustainability at horizontal level. 
This is, what at national level is substantially 
more clear-cut due to the historical and political 
roots of every legal principle. In Europe, the 
evident increasing proximity of Energy and 
Environmental policy means a whole process of 
‘Europeanisation’ of Energy Law and the 
possibility of bringing different sovereign 
bodies to delegate such a crucial matter to 
                                                          
18 On the evolution of these debates and for an up-dated 
picture of the Energy Market and Capacity Mechanisms in 
the EU see, L. Hancher, A. Hauteclocque, M. Sadowska 
(eds.), Capacity Mechanisms in the EU Energy Market, 
Oxford press, 2015.  
19 Just to mention the most important ones. Let’s start with 
the first of these factors, the finite nature or scarcity of fossil 
fuel. The main problem Europe faces is that of import 
dependency, due to a lack of domestic resources and 
growing competition from other Organization for European 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries as well as 
the emerging markets in Asia and Latin America. Scarcity 
also results from a lack of investment in the development of 
new deposits, insufficient diversification, hesitant progress 
on energy productivity, and disinterest in research on 
alternative sources of energy at the time of cheap fossil 
fuels. Insufficient or inefficient investment is partly due to 
the (re)nationalization of energy resources and state-owned 
companies that are also guided by non-economic interests. 
The combination of reduced energy availability, perceived 
energy insecurity, and growing demand will constrain 
economic development in the near future because of reduced 
or prohibitively expensive energy supplies. In the future, 
there will be greater tensions around gaining access to the 
remaining fossil fuels. Further consequences of scarcity are 
higher prices on tighter markets and, in the long run, an 
increase in the demand for renewable energy sources (RES) 
and an effort towards higher energy efficiency.  On this see, 
F. Bauman, “A common market and Sustainable Energy for 
Europe”, in P. Barnes and Hoerber, Sustainable 
Development and Governance in Europe. The evolution of 
the discourse on Sustainability. Routledge, (2013), p 77 et 
seg. 
The second factor is the impact of periods of political 
instability on energy prices. 
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achieve a sort of supportive body of 
legislation 20.  
Let’s start with the principle of “conferral” 
encapsulated in the very first article of the 
Treaty of the European Union; it stipulates that 
“[t]he Member States confer competences to 
attain objectives they have in common”21. 
Further on, in article 5 (2) of the TEU we get 
the limits of the principle of conferral22, “[t]he 
Union shall act only within the limits conferred 
upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to 
attain the objectives set out there in”23. What is 
of importance to us are the shared competences. 
Energy and environment are, according to the 
TFEU shared competences and thereby adhere 
to the principles related to this particular regard 
in Article 2(2) TFEU and then, environment and 
energy listed as shared competences in Article 
4(2) e) and i) TFEU respectively. The new 
constitutional setting brings about within the 
areas of environment and energy a more 
detailed regulatory setting, this is it within the 
Treaty itself and, within the context (on the 
other side) of a fragmented and infinite 
secondary legislation. This, shall prevent 
Member States from acting with an ‘egoistic’ 
criteria, and the possibility for the EU to 
enhance the objectives of such policies in a 
more coherent, collaborative and efficient 
manner.  
Then, we jump into the well-established 
principle of environmental integration enshrined 
in Article 11 of the TFEU24 with a clear and a 
strong wording. Still, how can it be realistically 
applied to foster an effective transformation of 
MS regulation towards a transition guided by 
                                                          
20 Using Collier words on, U. Collier, Energy and 
Environment in the European Union, Aldershot, (1994), p. 
36. His point about supportive policies draws on the 
conceptualisation of environmental policy integration and he 
defines such integration as “achieving sustainable 
development and preventing environmental damage; 
removing contradictions between policies as well as within 
policies, and realizing mutual benefits and the goal of 
making policies mutually supportive”, his point which is 
shared by our view was perhaps missing at that time today’s 
European Constitutional framework, that needs the ‘support’ 
of the institutional body of the EU and specially a stronger 
role of the CJEU on defining the guiding principles for an 
integrated approach aiming at sustainable development.     
21 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, 
Article 1 (1), 2008, OJEU, 115/15.  
22 What we will see when analysing case law, is that, 
accordingly and nonetheless the principle of conferral, the 
Union has competences to take legally binding measures to 
ensure that protection of the environment is at least taken 
into consideration, even when commercial policy is 
involved or when other decisions are being taken in other 
fields, such as energy, transport, trade, etc…. 
23 Article 5 (2) Ibid, p.18.  
24 Article 11 of the TFEU (Ex art. 6 TEC) reads as follows: 
“Environmental Protection requirements must be integrated 
into the definition and implementation of the Union’s 
policies and activities in particular with a view to promoting 
sustainable development.”  
“sustainability” if a truly green energy sector is 
not consolidated yet at European level?. The 
principle enshrined by this article should be read 
in accordance with another provision of general 
application in order to trigger some effective 
results, Article 7 of the TFEU25. This article 
provides the legal basis for the Union to ensure 
consistency between its various legal policies 
and activities. This is determinant in the field of 
energy policy where environmental objectives 
are expressly or even indirectly included, and 
although no priority between the Union’s 
environmental policy and its energy policy 
exists, it is certainly clear that energy provisions 
entail more environmental aims than the 
environmental provision defining energy related 
goals26.    
Important to note though that there is an open 
window towards the intertwined nature of the 
legal basis of such differentiated provisions. So, 
following this line of reasoning it is worth 
assessing Article 194 (1) TFEU; it provides that 
the Union’s energy policy shall regard to the 
need to preserve and improve the environment 
whereas Article 191(1) TFEU refers to the 
objective of combating climate change”27 that 
has at its core a complex matrix of energy 
aspects. Nonetheless, the legal basis chosen by 
one of the most important normative elements 
of the EU energy policy, (this is the current 
Renewable Energy Directive) is the one of 
environmental competence (Article 192 (1))28 
where the EU ordinary legislative procedure 
applies29. Article 192 (2) always under the 
umbrella of environmental policy, refers to 
issues for which Member States are more 
reluctant to lose decision-making power30 and 
                                                          
25 Article 7 of the TFEU reads as follows: “The Union shall 
ensure consistency between its policies and activities, taking 
all of its objectives into account and in accordance with the 
principle of conferral of powers.” 
26 Article 11 TFEU and Article 37 of the Charter read 
together do on this direction, see, E. Morgera, M. Durán, 
“Article 37”, in S. Peers, T. Harvey, J. Kenner and A. Ward, 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, 
Hart Publishing, (2014), p. 983-1003. 
27 Opinion AG Mazák in case C-2/10 Azienda Agro-
Zootecnica Franchini sarl and Eolica di Altamura Srl v 
Regione Puglia [2011] ECR I-6561, para. 47.  
28 Old Article 175 ECT regulating environmental policy.  
Article originated in the Single European Act of 1987 
providing a general competence for environmental 
legislation in the EU and including also energy issues. 
29 It entails a joint adoption of legislation by the Parliament 
and the Council, on the basis of a proposal from the 
Commission.  
30 Article 192 (c) measures significantly affecting a Member 
State's choice between different energy sources and the 
general structure of its energy supply. See supra note 68, old 
article 175 (c). 
The Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, 
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, may make the ordinary legislative procedure 
6 
 
even if one could think that it was more 
adequate (considering the Renewable Energy 
Directive touches upon Member States 
capacities to move to renewable energy sources 
for, in total, at least 20% of EU Energy 
consumption), it was not chosen on purpose by 
the Member States. It is also, important to stress 
that within the current EU Constitutional 
framework, along with environmental 
competences, there are two other competences 
relevant for energy measures, article 194 TFEU 
that embodies the heart of EU energy policy 
competence, and article 114 TFEU31 in relation 
to articles 17, 18, 19 of the Directive 
2009/28/EC which addresses the sustainability 
criteria for biofuels and bioliquids, and provides 
evidence of another serious paradoxical 
measure. It is an article of an ‘integrative’ 
nature at its core for it stipulates a high level of 
protection to be taken concerning health, safety, 
environmental protection and consumer 
protection. The paradox has to do with the fact 
that by choosing such legal basis for articles 17, 
18 and 19 of the Renewable Energy Directive 
the internal market is seen as the primary goal 
of the provisions that deal with the sustainability 
criteria but just focused on biofuels and 
bioliquids, whilst the sustainability criteria is 
extremely important in general for Member 
States compliance with the renewable energy 
targets and the success of the internal energy 
market.  
Instead, the energy provisions that could be 
future legal basis for a sustainable normative 
body addressing energy issues, are found on 
Article 194. This article encompasses a lower 
protection level of the environment though. 
Reference to the environment is stipulated in 
order “to preserve and improve” it. So, even if it 
may seem like the respective aims of renewable 
energy directive are tailor-made for Article 194 
TFEU, the legal basis was not questioned in the 
revision process in 2012 despite of the 
argumentation put forward that “[…]energy 
measures aiming at preventing climate change 
should be adopted by virtue of both Articles 192 
(1)32 and 194 (2) TFEU”33, this of course 
underpins the understanding that European 
measures enacted based on either legal basis 
contribute to the common European interest, 
                                                                               
applicable to the matters referred to in the first 
subparagraph. 
31 Old article 95 ECT. 
32 Here the main procedure for legislation in the EU, the 
ordinary procedure, applies. It entails a joint adoption of 
legislation by the Parliament and the Council, on the basis of 
a proposal from the Commission. Voting in the European 
Parliament is by simple majority, whereas for the Council a 
qualified majority vote is prescribed. 
33 N. De Sadeleer, EU Environmental Law and the Internal 
Market, Oxford University press, (2014), p. 136. 
and the Articles34  that could eventually rise 
most controversial aspects regarding national 
sovereignty are excluded.   
One point that becomes clear, and it is the most 
wide-spread opinion35, is that the promotion of 
renewable energy is best guaranteed when the 
objectives of the environmental policy are 
pursued, but what happens when the objectives 
of environmental policy are strongly intertwined 
with energy policy and the way Member States 
deal with energy supply?. Indeed, acting under 
article 192 (1), EU legislation can interfere with 
the Member State’s rights regarding energy. As 
already Peeters36 has argued there is no case law 
on this gap in the TFEU regarding the legal 
competence for environmental energy 
measures37 that do not significantly affect the 
mentioned Member States’ choices on the 
matter of exploiting their energy sources. This 
leaves us with the question whether Article 192 
(1) TFEU can be seen as valid basis for 
measures that do not concern significant 
renewable energy action, but do affect Member 
State’s choices as being formulated in Article 
194 (2) TFEU38.   
Fortunately, the current principle of integrating 
the environment into all EU policies, the basic 
requirement in making sustainable development 
work, has been given a prominent place at the 
beginning of Part III on policies, thereby 
confirming its application to all policies and 
activities of the Union. Although its position in 
Part III is not as prominent as in the Amsterdam 
Treaty it nevertheless affirms a clear 
commitment and obligation by the EU39. 
                                                          
34As an exception, and particularly for issues for which 
Member States were reluctant to lose decision-making 
power, unanimity voting is required for selected topics. This 
is according to Article 192 (2) © TFEU, the case for 
“measures significantly affecting a Member State’s choice 
between different energy sources and the general structure 
of its energy supply”.  
35 M. Peeters, “Governing Towards renewable Energy in the 
EU: Competences, Instruments, and procedures”, 21 MJ 1 
2014,p.43. 
36 See M. Peeters, Ibid. 
37 Broadly speaking could involve a multitude of aspects 
considering the implications of energy related topics when 
assessing todays’ climate problems. 
38 Article 194 (2) states that energy measures “shall not 
affect a Member State’s right to determine the conditions for 
exploiting its energy sources, its choice between different 
energy sources and the general structure of its energy 
supply”, but refers also to the possibility to adopt measures 
on the basis of the environmental competence, particularly 
Article 192 (2) © TFEU.  
39 For a fantastic historical background of the integration 
approach and its enshrinement as a EU Constitutional 
Principle, see, J.H. Hans, “Stop the integration principle?”,  
Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 33, issue 5, 
(2011), . It suffices to say that elements of it can already be 
found in Principle 13 of the 1972 Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (the so 
called “Stockholm Declaration”): In order to achieve a more 
rational management of resources and thus to improve the 
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Furthermore, the environmental integration 
principle according to tittle II of the TFEU has, 
together with some other integration principles, 
become a provision of general application. In 
fact, at the time the environmental integration 
principle was inserted in the EEC Treaty by the 
SEA, it was the only integration principle 
significant. Nowadays, the environmental 
integration principle is only one among many 
other integration principles40. In our view, what 
makes the difference is the association of such 
principle to sustainability for the sake of giving 
coherence to the whole Constitutional project of 
the EU, even, if “under the disguise of 
integration certain environmental standards will 
be diluted or off set against other interests and 
policy considerations”41.  
Following the thread of the holistic approach of 
sustainable development that the new 
Constitutional setting brings about (TEU, TFEU 
and EUCHR), we should turn our attention to 
Article 3(3) of the Treaty on the European 
Union. It mandates the establishment of an 
internal market based on the “sustainable 
development of Europe” based on: 1. “Balanced 
economic growth and price stability”; 2. “a 
highly competitive social market economy 
aimed at achieving full employment and social 
progress”, and 3. “a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment”. 
Thus, the historical objective of the EU, which 
accordingly aims at the creation of an internal 
market, must be accomplished incorporating 
sustainable development’s principles of 
                                                                               
environment, States should adopt an integrated and 
coordinated approach to their development planning so as to 
ensure that development is compatible with the need to 
protect and improve environment for the benefit of their 
population. 
40J. H. Jans, “Stop the integration principle?”, Fordham 
International Law Journal, vol. 33, issue 5, (2011),  The 
Lisbon treaty brought about a proliferation of ‘integration’ 
principles. Let’s start with article 7 TFEU, the Union shall 
“ensure consistency between its policies and activities, 
taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance 
with the principle of “conferral of powers”. Article 8 TFEU 
requires that the Union “[i]n all its activities . . . shall aim to 
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between 
men and women.”63 Article 9 TFEU states: “In defining 
and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall 
take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a 
high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social 
protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high 
level of education, training and protection of human health.” 
This is followed by article 10 TFEU: “In defining and 
implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim 
to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation.” Furthermore, article 12 establishes “[c]onsumer 
protection requirements shall be taken into account in 
defining and implementing other Union policies and 
activities” according to article 12 TFEU. Finally, article 13 
TFEU requires that “full regard” is being paid to the welfare 
requirements of animals. As Jans, argues, everything has to 
be taken into account with everything.  
41 Jans, ibid, p. 1445. 
balancing economic growth in a social market 
economy with a high level of environmental 
protection.  Additionally, it defines sustainable 
development in the EU context by outlining the 
three objectives described above. There on, 
Article 3 (5) of the TEU fosters some sort of 
global and transboundary ‘solidarity’ by 
requiring the EU to contribute to “the 
sustainable development of the Earth” through 
its international relationships. Article 21 (2) of 
the TEU mandates EU States to “foster 
sustainable economic, social and environmental 
development of developing countries, with the 
primary aim of eradicating poverty”, 
furthermore, sustainable development must be 
ensured using international cooperation to 
“preserve and improve the quality of the 
environment and the sustainable management of 
global natural resources”. 
There it comes Article 6 (1) of the TEU that 
incorporating into EU law a recognition of “the 
rights, freedoms and principles of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union” 
brings into the “constitutional” scenario, Article 
37 of the Charter, placed under the “solidarity” 
title of the Charter of Rights and reads as 
follows, “[a] high level of environmental 
protection and the improvement of the quality of 
the environment must be integrated into the 
policies of the Union and ensured in accordance 
with the principle of sustainable development”. 
From a legal point of view, it is probably more 
important to ascertain the normative 
achievement at Constitutional level as a whole, 
than making emphasis on considerations such as 
the downgrading of the integration principle of 
environmental nature contained in either article 
11 of the TFEU and the Charter of Rights. 
According to Jans,  
“[F]rom a non-binding declaration, the Charter 
became a document with the same legal status 
and hierarchy as the TEU post-Lisbon and the 
TFEU. That triggers the question of what might 
be the legal consequences of the differences 
between Article 11 TFEU on the one hand and 
Article 37 of the Charter on the other. As the 
obligation contained in article 37 of the Charter 
seems to be more limited than the one in article 
11 TFEU […]”42. 
Thus, what we see is that, despite of the fact that 
the Treaty of Amsterdam succeeded in making 
decision-making in the context of the Title on 
the Environment less complex, is the Lisbon 
Treaty that aims at a more ambitious plan, and 
as a consequence it settles the basis for a more 
reliable model of “governance”43 introducing 
competences with a well-structured decisional 
                                                          
42 J.H. Hans, “Stop the integration principle?”, Fordham 
International Law Journal, vol. 33, issue 5, (2011), p. 1544. 
43 See further, K. Bosselman, The Principle of 
Sustainability. Transforming Law and Governance. 
Ashgate, (2008).  
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model for each one of those competences. Still, 
we should bear in mind that in the field of 
Environment and Energy Law (and not only) 
there are some institutional and cultural 
complexities that have not been resolved by the 
Treaty of Lisbon and so forth, the consolidated 
version of the Treaties.  
Our question is, would a specific protocol on 
Sustainable Development further clarify the 
nature of actions that the EU would need to 
undertake to accomplish this respect at 
institutional and normative level? Would the 
integrating principle encapsulated on a truly 
holistic regulatory approach foster the right 
legislative framework to enforce more rigid 
objectives towards the conversion of our 
economies and societies to renewable energy 
sources? It all depends on the normative 
instrument that will be chosen next in order to 
further regulate future phases of the Climate 
mitigation Policies, fossil fuel reduction or total 
elimination of it; as well as the legal basis that 
will be selected for next regulatory frameworks 
aiming at sustainability in the areas of Energy 
and Environment (e.g. Renewable Energies 
establishing criteria after the period covered by 
the current regulation (2030)).  
V. A unique Governance Model on 
Sustainability in Europe: 
Weaknesses of this model.  
Whilst sustainable development has a 
welcoming place in the new EU Constitution, it 
emerges a failure to include in it the ecological 
dimension that should emerge from every 
related policy, this is ‘protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment’, 
on equal footing with the economic and social 
components of sustainable development. It is 
not by chance that, one of the main difficulties 
environmental law has been facing up till now is 
related to the fact that the legal order of the EU 
is conceptualised in terms of economic 
integration44 particularly at stake when it comes 
to energy topics.  
Greater integration guided by sustainability 
either perceived as an objective, or as a 
principle (being already developed as a concept 
despite of the lack of its concrete nature) should 
further simplify the procedural mechanisms 
behind the EU administrative body and EU 
policy action. The integration principle fosters 
the proactive nature of ‘sustainability’ on the 
basis of the conciliatory nature of 
‘sustainability’ that the Court has already 
                                                          
44 See generally on this argument and the evolution of 
Environmental law in relation to the Energy market, Nicolas 
de Sadeleer, EU Environmental Law and the internal 
market, Oxford, 2014.  
ascertained45 in the past, in the case First 
Corporate Shipping46. By doing this, there is no 
risk of discarding the ‘environment’ as a 
primary interest to be protected47, especially if 
one was to assert the need to conciliate the three 
pillars of the sustainable development advocated 
by article 3 (3) TFEU.  
But, hurdles lie elsewhere. Perhaps the first 
symptom of contradictory nature on the EU 
sustainable governance model  lies on the 
inclusion of the Euratom Treaty, promoting 
nuclear energy at Community level, as an annex 
to the EU Constitution virtually unchanged. It is 
difficult not to speak of European Union 
legislation and Environmental Law without 
considering so many topics at once. Especially 
when we talk about environmental legislation 
under the new clothes of climate change policy 
and greenhouse gas reduction.48 The lack of a 
coherent, systematic and efficient policy is 
displaced by a prolific growth of norms of 
different rank. Under environmental challenges 
we now address unsustainable patterns of 
consumption especially in the food, energy and 
transport sector (more evident after the 
economic and financial crisis). 
In Europe and elsewhere there is already a 
prolific literature on sustainable development 
understood as a holistic framework in which to 
operate, what Jeff Sachs calls, “a normative 
outlook on the world”, meaning “a set of goals 
to which the world should aspire”, but still an 
empty chapter towards how this holistic 
approach should be enforced by courts through 
specific ‘legal interests’ to be protected is 
missing, and its most crucial aspect concerning 
energy is an open door for ‘discussion’. In 
Europe things are clearly, more and more, 
                                                          
45 The interpretation given by Advocate General Léger to 
‘sustainable development’ in its opinion in First Corporate 
Shipping, a case on development taking place in protected 
birds’ habitats is a testament of the conciliatory nature of 
‘sustainability’.  See case C-371/98 First Corporate 
Shipping [2000] E.C.R. I-9235. Paragraph 54.  
46 Ibid opinion of AG Léger, the AG stressed in paragraph 
54, “the concept of “sustainable development” does not 
mean that the interests of the environment must necessarily 
and systematically prevail over the interests defended in the 
context of other policies pursued by the Community…On 
the contrary, it emphasizes the necessary balance between 
various interests which sometimes clash, but which must be 
reconciled.  
47 See De Sadeleer, on supra note 36, p. 50. Sadeleer fears 
that such conciliatory nature of Sustainable development 
might water down environmental protection.  
48 EU leaders agreed on 23 October 2014 the domestic 2030 
greenhouse gas reduction target of at least 40% compared to 
1990 together with the other main building blocks of the 
2030 policy framework for climate and energy, as proposed 
by the European Commission in January 2014. This 2030 
policy framework aims to make the European Union's 
economy and energy system more competitive, secure and 
sustainable and also sets a target of at least 27% for 
renewable energy and energy savings by 2030. 
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taking this “normative outlook on the world”. 
But, the lack of emphasis on a truly ecological 
dimension is certainly missing when it comes to 
the EU market dimension and its shift to a 
clean, low-carbon energy system for the sake of 
a ‘high’ preservation of the environment and 
natural resources. Here is where the EU 
constitutional approach exhibits its weakness for 
being so much dependant on market 
mechanisms and geopolitical interests of MS. It 
remains to be seen whether the political agenda 
is willing to foster more ambitious legislation at 
EU level aiming at the reduction of greenhouse 
gases and willing to touch upon the topic of 
competences when it comes to environmentally 
related renewable energy measures.  
Still, what is needed is greater involvement of 
civil society and local forms of governance, that 
after the Paris meeting and COP21 seems to 
strengthen the local dimension that brings more 
public participation into play, transparency and 
long-lasting efficient mechanisms that build on 
sustainable solutions. On a more institutional 
level means widening the governance dialogue 
to ensure a diversification of stakeholder 
involvement. It is at local level that many 
crucial problems of environmental nature should 
be dealt with.49 The ambitious outcomes of 
Paris COP 21 dealing with Climate Policies in 
Europe are accused of not being currently strong 
enough to deliver on the Paris Pledge. This 
affirmation gives evidence of the need for more 
ambitious and coordinated plans at local level 
despite of the current existing action on this at 
European level.50  
Other drawbacks in the implementation of 
sustainability are found on the crucial 
institutional role disclosed by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It has 
not made efforts to define or give concrete 
substance to the sustainability concept as it was 
done in the past by the memorable case 
                                                          
49 Along with Twining reasoning, we understand that against 
the intense contemporary flow of legal phenomena beyond 
the nation-state boundaries (whether international, 
transitionally private, regional, etc..) what is more 
interesting, is the resulting dense layering and interweaving 
of regulatory activity that is far from being ‘nested in a 
single vertical hierarchy’, in which the planetary level has 
the highest ranked place. Local initiatives today are showing 
us the importance of joining efforts at global level. See, W. 
Twining, Globalisation and Legal Scholarship, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, pp. 24-5. 
50 Within the EU, there are many independent sustainability 
councils operating at national or regional level. Thirteen 
advisory bodies from nine European countries are member 
of the European Environment and Sustainable Development 
Advisory Councils (EEAC) Network. With representatives 
from academia, civil society, the private sector and public 
bodies the EEAC network brings together experts with years 
of experience producing independent advice. See, 
http://eeac-network.eu/ 
Comission v Denmark51 (returnable bottles case 
that gives life to the ‘integration principle’) by 
which environmental protection was accepted as 
a mandatory requirement capable of justifying 
restrictions on Article 34 and 35 TFEU even if 
environmental protection is not one of the 
grounds of justification mentioned in Article 36 
of the TFEU. The ‘entering into life’ of the 
integration principle has produced a fertile body 
of environmental legal enforcement at European 
level, still when it comes to energy (considered 
as a good), nor the RES directive, nor the free 
movement of goods provision related to 
renewable energy produced interchangeably by 
MS the European Court has given proof of a 
consistent case law building on the creation of a 
solid internal energy market. Instead, The CJEU 
has shown a clear deference towards national 
support schemes regarding the production of 
renewable energy at national level without 
considering the distorting nature of such 
mechanisms for the creation of the Internal 
Energy Market. The CJEU has decided not to 
act as a corrective organ to remove technical 
obstacles for cross-border electricity trade and 
grid access. In case of conflict between 
contradictory assessments of EU secondary law 
(such as the RES Directive and the provision of 
the TFEU for the free movement of goods), the 
CJEU in Ålands Vindkraft decided in favour of 
allowing MS the freedom to set down in the 
considerations for the Renewable Energy 
Directive (Article 3(3) of the RES Directive 
2009) granting them the right to solely subsidize 
power production taking place in its sovereign 
territory. Only the Advocate general, against the 
majority opinion, noted that the technical 
obstacles for cross-border electricity trade that 
still exist, especially difficulties with grid access 
and the absence of alliance are an indication that 
the creation of a single EU electricity market 
remains incomplete52. The case of Ålands and 
Vindkraft is just one decision on the top of a list 
of case that give evidence of a clearly 
“uncomumnautaire”53 thinking54. The European 
                                                          
51 Commission v. Denmark (Danish Bottles), Case 302/86, 
[1988] E.C.R. 4607. 
52 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 28 January 
2014, Case C-573/12 Ålands Vindkraft AB v 
Energimyndighetne EU:C:2014:37. See further, Steinbach 
and Bruckmann, “Renewable Energy and the Free 
Movement of Goods”, Journal of Environmental Law, Issue 
I, 2015.  
53 Quoting H. Vedder on his work “Good Neighbourliness in 
a Sustainable European Internal Electricity Market: A Tale 
of Communities and Uncommunautaire Thinking”, in D. 
Kochenov, E. Basheska, (ed). Good Neighbourliness in the 
European Legal Context, Nijhoff, 2015. 
54 See Case C-213/96 Outokumpu Oy [1998] ECR I-1777 
and Svenska Kraftnät case. Commission Decision in Case 
COMP/39.351 Swedish Interconnectors, where the market 
test notice was published in [2009] OJ C239/9. Comented 
by  Hans HB Vedder ‘Competition in the EU Energy Sector 
10 
 
Court’s inclination towards regional restrictions 
is inappropriate for promoting environmental 
protection (opinion already disregarded by the 
Court in Essent Belgium). In Essent Belgium 
AG Bot suggested that an EU-wide subsidy 
system would lower the costs for the expansion 
of renewable energies by allowing a more 
rational choice of generation sites55. It is widely 
accepted now that the CJEU has shown more 
restraint in these cases concerning ‘energy’ 
topics than in other proportionality tests in the 
area of environmental law56.  
We also know that little has been gained from 
the conclusion that the integration requirement 
is an objective and not a principle57. To go 
beyond the ambit of environmental and energy 
law will be difficult as long as the Court will not 
take a strong position towards creating grounds 
of protection for the promotion of sustainability 
as a principle, an objective or as an 
‘interpretation criteria’. So, what it is essential 
to us here, is to underline the distinction that 
Sadeleer58 rightly draws between the 
environmental approach and the sustainability 
approach when integrating Energy and 
Environmental policies. The ‘protection of the 
environment’ would provide us a defensive 
approach, whereas ‘sustainability’ would trigger 
a proactive approach calling for the integration 
of environmental requirements into the 
economic growth with the limits already settled 
by the court on the promotion of economic 
interest balanced against the objectives of social 
policy59.  
VI. The hurdles to achieve a truly 
ecological content of the EU 
energy policy: Challenges of the 
Internal Energy Market 
                                                                               
– An Overview of Developments in 2009 and 2010’ in 
Martha M Roggenkamp and Ulf Hammer (eds) European 
Energy Law Report VIII (Intersentia, Antwerp 2011) 8-11.  
55 Opinion of Advocate General Bot delivered on 8 May 
2013, Joined Cases C-204/12-C208/12 Essent Belgium NV 
v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits-en 
Gasmarket EU:C.2013:294 [107]. 
56 See further, P. Oliver, Oliver on Free Movement of Goods 
in the European Union, 5th ed. Hart Publishing, 2010, p. 
219, 303.  
57 On this see, S. Kingston, European Perspectives on 
Environmental Law and Governance, Routledge, (2013). 
58 N. De Sadeleer, Ibid op. cit., p.50.  
59 In the past the CJEU has already strongly stands in front 
of the idea that the EU has not only an economic but also a 
social purpose (Case C-43/75 Gabriele Defrenne v Societé 
anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, [1976] E.C. 
R. I-455.paragraph 12 ) and accordingly the rights under the 
provisions of the treaty on the free movement of goods, 
person, services and capital must be balanced against the 
objectives pursued  by social policy (Case C-438/05 Viking 
Line, [2007] E.C.R. I- 10779 p. 79; Case C-341/05, Laval 
un Patneri Ltd. V Svenska [2007] E.C.R. I-11767, paragraph 
105; Case C-319/07, 3 f v Commission, [2009] E.C.R. I-
000, paragraph 58. On this see Sadeleer, Ibid cit. p. 50. 
The Internal Energy Market (IEM) within the 
EU is simultaneously a source of legal 
confusion in the midst of divergent traditions 
and ideologies and fertile road towards juridical 
convergence into a common regulatory culture. 
The need for regulation and for the well-
functioning of independent regulatory 
authorities (such as the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)) is 
in conflict with the legal orders of some 
Member States of the EU60, but not only. The 
truth is that there is a lot of controversy around 
one of the most crucial regulatory instruments to 
build the energy transition towards a 
Sustainable Europe, the RES Directive. We 
should not forget that the central elements for 
the well-functioning of the EU market in the 
context of energy, however, are the market 
integration and sustainability objectives that the 
EU has set itself. 
 
Instead, as we have already seen, the 
mechanisms are clearly focused on the 
strengthening of national regimes and the 
current regulatory environment does not 
properly reflect externalities of energy 
production in market prices, including 
environmental, social, innovation and economic 
externalities. Complex administrative 
procedures for renewable energy deployment at 
national and local level have not yet been 
eliminated and there is a strong necessity to 
adapt the market design and remove barriers61. 
The existing policy framework (the 3rd Energy 
Package) does not address uncertainties with 
regard to national policies, governance and 
regional cooperation to ensure a timely and cost 
effective target achievement for the period after 
2020. So, it means that in order to face future 
challenges we need new legislation, but also 
new enforceable solutions that move on the 
direction of removing obstacles for renewable 
cross-border electricity trade and production 
without fiscal differences, and further 
enhancement of gird access and regional 
cooperation. It does not matter that the RES 
Directive ensures that all MS will contribute to 
                                                          
60 Hans Vedder, “The Constitutionality of Competition. 
European Internal market law and fine line between 
markets, public interests, and self-regulation in a changing 
constitutional setting”, in F. Amtenbrink and P. Van den 
Berg (eds)., The Constitutional Integrity of the European 
Union, T.M.C. ASSER PRESS, 2010, p. 204 et seg. 
61 For a deeper discussion on the market-based provisions of 
the RES Directive and their compatibility with the free 
movement of goods within the EU, see A. Johnston and 
others, “The Proposed new EU Renewables Directive: 
Interpretation, Problems and Prospects” EEELR 17, 2008, 
p.126.S. Penttinen and k. Talus, “Development of the 
Sustainability Aspects of EU Energy Policy”, University of 
Eastern Finland, Legal Studies Research Papers, Paper No. 
16, 2014, p. 14. 
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reaching 20% renewables at EU-level by 2020. 
We need a more ambitious plan to reinforce EU 
governance on sustainability. As highlighted in 
the 2030 climate and Energy framework the 
current legislation will not be sufficient for this 
purpose62. The European council agreed that at 
least 27% share of renewables by 2030 would 
reflect a cost-optimal way of building a secure, 
sustainable and competitive energy system 
capable of fighting climate change.  
It is true that since the first Energy Directives 
for electricity (1996) and gas (1998) were 
passed, the utility scene in Europe has been 
transformed with the massive unbundling of 
transmission networks and the expansion of the 
largest companies outside their home markets. 
Liberalisation and decarbonisation policies have 
changed the way electricity is generated. 
Moreover, an ambitious legislative agenda for 
the creation of the Energy Union has been 
adopted by the EC for the years 2015 and 
201663. Nonetheless, the primary objectives of 
the EU constitutional setting on sustainability 
and Energy Directives have not been achieved, 
this is, transforming the electricity and gas 
industries from regulated monopolies to 
competitive markets and the creation of a single 
European energy market. Regulation seems not 
to guarantee a safe pool for investments (either 
national, foreign or private), and the free 
movement of goods under the EU Treaties is a 
“long lost treasure”64.  It is still under discussion 
whether, in the absence of the need to mitigate 
climate change, the model proposed by the 
Commission could have worked, for instance, in 
order to intensify relationships between the 
nominated electricity market operators 
(NEMOS) and Transmission operator systems 
(TO’s). The regionalisation of transmission 
system operators should be conjoined with the 
supervision of such initiatives by ACER.65 
Interestingly, the regionalisation of ENTSO-E is 
                                                          
62 As highlighted in the baseline scenario of the 2030 
climate and energy framework (COM (2014) 15 final).  
63 Including: (i) an amendment to the Regulation on the 
security of supply of electricity (ii) an amendment to the 
Third Energy Package to inter alia strengthen the powers of 
the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators; (iii)the 
issuance of guidelines on regional cooperation and 
strengthening coordination of the energy policies of MS; 
(iv) the adoption of a new list of major energy infrastructure 
which will be considered as Projects of Common Interest 
and thus eligible for EU funding; and (v) the preparation of 
a comprehensive strategy on liquefied natural gas and its 
storage.  
64 Peter Oliver, “Free Movement of Goods in the Labyrinth 
of Energy Policy and Capacity Mechanisms”, on Leigh 
Hancher, A. De Hauteclocque, and Malgorzata Sadowska 
(eds.), Capacity Mechanisms in the EU Energy Market, 
Oxford University Press, 2015.  
65 ACER is established by Regulation 713/2009, OJ 2009 L 
211/1. 
not matched to the same extent within ACER.66 
The regional initiatives adopted by ENTSO-E 
should also be monitored by ACER, which also 
addresses regional initiatives67. These regional 
initiatives could be bottom-up governance 
structures that involve the regulators, TSO, 
energy exchanges and other relevant parties 
with a view to create greater market integration. 
However, for many years to come, climate 
change objectives are only likely to be met 
using policy instruments that over-ride the 
market. Despite this, the Commission is still 
focused only on trying to make markets work, 
sometimes at the expense of constitutional 
premises that have enhanced a sustainability 
objective without providing for specific 
enforcement instruments. In any case renewable 
energy sources have grown rapidly and 26% of 
the EU’s power is generated from renewables 
and 10% of total electricity is now sourced from 
intermittent sources, such as wind and solar68.  
Things seem to become even more complicated 
when it comes to safeguard security of 
electricity supply (capacity mechanisms). The 
Commission itself has shown concerns that 
capacity mechanisms may unduly favour 
particular producers or technologies and they 
may create obstacles to trade in electricity 
across borders69. Lessons learned from the 
sector enquiry launched by the Commission 
itself should help to support the development of 
more regional approaches to security of supply, 
as where capacity mechanisms are used they 
will increasingly need to be opened up to allow 
participation across national borders. The 
Commission has ascertained that when 
introduced prematurely, without proper problem 
identification or in an uncoordinated manner, 
and without taking into account the contribution 
of cross-border resources, there is a risk that 
capacity mechanisms distort cross-border 
electricity trade and competition. They may 
reward new investments only in certain types of 
generation or exclude demand response. Thus, 
in a nutshell we could say that at the moment 
MS solution to use capacity mechanism in order 
                                                          
66 ACER has as one of its objectives the promotion of 
cooperation between national regulators at regional and 
community levels, Regulation 713/2009, Article 7(3). 
67Ibid, Article 6(9). 
68 European Commission ‘Renewable energy progress 
report’ 15th June 2015, COM (2015) 293. 
69 Interim Report of the Sector Inquiry on Capacity 
Mechanisms. Report from the Commission C(2016) 2107 
final Brussels, 13.4.2016. {SWD(2016) 119 final} 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/capacity_mec
hanism_report_en.pdf  last accessed on the 5th August 2016. 
Over the past year the Commission has collected a large 
amount of information on existing and planned capacity 
mechanisms in 11 Member States. It has investigated why 
Member States implement capacity mechanisms, how these 
mechanisms are designed and what their effects are on 
competition and trade in the internal electricity market.  
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to guarantee security of supply may lead to 
unsurmountable disadvantages for the 
objectives of an integrated energy market at 
European level henceforth compromising the 
EU governance model on sustainable 
development that should start by empowering 
consumers and strengthen regional cooperation. 
Capacity mechanisms through tailor-made 
solutions by single Member States bring 
uncertainty for investors and limit the 
Commission control on crucial public service 
obligations. Great expectations should come due 
to the role of ACER in order to leave behind the 
administrative differences and difficulties of MS 
on implementing regional projects and market 
coupling. ACER has an important role on 
implementing cross-border Electricity Exchange 
regulation and transparency regulation by 
speeding up projects, permits and administrative 
procedures70. Concerning gas, the problematic 
issues diverge, it has already been suggested 
that regional and EU interests should be well 
accounted for, and an obligation modelled on 
Art 36 (8) and (9) of the Gas Directive to 
request an opinion from ACER or the 
Commission could be introduced in order to 
enhance the integration of the energy market. 
There are important differences between the 
hub-based Western markets and the isolated 
Eastern markets on the pipeline distribution and 
the differences of the role of gas in MS’ 
economies.  
As a matter of fact European Union member 
states have many differences in terms of their 
energy security and, in particular, in their degree 
of exposure to a possible disruption of gas 
supplies from Russia. There are many European 
States importing gas from Russia having formal 
and Long-term gas contracts with Gazprom and 
this has proven to be a problem for the 
European market dimension71. Nonetheless 
some of those states are protected from 
disruptions either because they have sufficient 
storage capacity, or, as in the case of Italy and 
Germany have had traditionally an established 
commercial and political relationship with 
Russia, or at the same time have internal 
supplies or liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities 
to diversify away from Russia, which is the case 
of France, the Netherlands, Italy and Greece. 
The big problem remains for those countries 
that are very dependent on Russian gas supplies 
                                                          
70 Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency 
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (Text with EEA 
relevance). 
71 On Long-term Gas import contracts see, A. de 
Hauteclocque, I. Conti, J-M. Glachant, “From a Reactive to 
a Proactive EU Regulatory Framework for Long-term Gas 
Import Contracts”, Florence School of Regulation, Policy 
Brief, Issue 2015/02 October 2015.  
(Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Czeck Republic, 
Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia)72. In 
addition, coal dominates the economies of 
Estonia, Poland, Czeck Republic and Bulgaria, 
so if European climate policy happens to be 
effective their exposure to natural gas supply 
security will grow and the need for security of 
supply mechanisms leaded by solidarity criteria 
would be urgently needed if we want to keep the 
leadership on a sustainable governance of our 
resources in Europe. Last August the European 
Commission finally allocated €187.5 million for 
the construction of the Balticconnector, the first 
Estonia-Finland gas pipeline73. It is remarkable 
that Finland has had up till now a single pipeline 
connected with the Russian gas supplier. The 
transition towards a new market model in the 
EU should affect existing pricing mechanisms 
and contracts, considering the above gas market 
situation for the Russian gas export monopolist 
(Gazprom) a separation between pipeline 
capacity and commodity markets also generates 
risks of capacity-supply mismatch and 
constitutes barriers to new pipelines projects74. 
At some point, we need to face up to the reality 
that the transition to a fully competitive energy 
market advocating for sustainability at the same 
time is still a long way to go.  
VII. Conclusions 
European integration in the area of Energy law 
shows some important paradoxes that we cannot 
ignore. On the one hand, energy policy in the 
EU has traditionally been rather insignificant 
despite of the fact that two of the three original 
treaties, the European Coal and Steal 
Community and EURATOM75 both, concerned 
Energy. So, we could say that energy had been 
the main cause of European integration, and it 
has been at the heart of the integration process 
since the start. ‘Paradoxically’, on the other 
hand, neither the energy security, nor the energy 
market regulation had ever become the subject 
of the EU supranational policy and we are far 
from gaining satisfactory results in terms of 
achieving a much more coordinated Energy 
                                                          
72 IEA 2016 Natural Gas Information available on:  
http://wds.iea.org/wds/pdf/Gas_documentation.pdf 
73According to https://www.neweurope.eu/article/eu-funds-
estonia-finland-pipe-lessen-gas-dependence-russia/ 
published on the 13th of August 2016. Last Accessed 17th of 
August 2016. 
74 According to A. Belyi, “Gazprom: slow to adapt and 
unable to exert influence”, Florence School of Regulation, 
Policy Brief Energy and Climate, Issue 2016/05, April 2016. 
75 Authors have observed the difference between the 
proclaimed aims of European Integration in energy issues at 
its very beginning and the real outcome after several 
decades. See, Andrei Belyi, “EU External Energy Policies: 
A Paradox of Integration”, in Europe’s Global Role, Jan 
Orbie (ed.), Ashgate (2008), p. 203. A.Belyi, “New 
Dimensions of Energy Security of the Emerging EU and 
their impact on Relations with Russia”, Journal of European 
Integration, 12/2003, 25 (4), pp. 351-369.  
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policy today even under a strong sustainability 
paradigm enshrined by the EU Constitutional 
framework. 
 
The truth is that the success of the 
environmental governance at EU level has 
convinced us of the idea that there exist the right 
legal basis for reconciling environmental 
protection with energy policy, also integrating 
social and economic considerations76 and all 
together establish regional cooperation on 
Climate change initiatives77 with a direct effect 
on energy markets. The truth is different. 
The EU is of course given evidence of an 
engaged primary and secondary law towards 
such common achievements but there are also 
different indications towards the contrary 
coming along from EU legislation, National 
laws and CJEU case law. Our focus has been 
placed on the paradoxes offered by the recently 
                                                          
76 The success of environmental governance at EU level is 
determined by its strong initial integration level. We could 
say along with Krämer, that “the EU is the only region in the 
world which has publicly committed itself to try to reconcile 
economic growth, social concerns and environmental 
protection”, see, Ludwig Krämer, “European Environmental 
Law: Innovative, integrative but also effective? In European 
legal Dynamics” Revised and updated Edition of Thirty 
Years of European Legal Studies at the College of Europe, 
edited by P. Demaret, I. Govaer and D. Hanf, Brussels: P. I. 
E. Peter Lang, pp. 345-356, p.355.  After a slow start in the 
1970s to tackle trans-boundary environmental issues and 
level the playing field for European businesses, EU 
environmental policies now cover water, air or noise 
pollution; habitat and biodiversity preservation; sustainable 
production and consumption and the fight against climate 
change. This afterthought of European integration – the 
environment wasn’t even mentioned in the EU’s founding 
Rome Treaty in 1951 – has now become central to the E 
U’s international affairs. For a more recent analyses on the 
EU Environmental Policy and its influence on the EU 
Energy policy see further, Emanuela Orlando, “The 
Evolution of the EU Policy and law in the Environmental 
field: Achievements and Current Challenges”, in C. Bakker 
and F. Francioni,  in The EU, the US and Global Climate 
Governance, Routledge 2014, pp. 61-81. On this topic, see 
also, A. Jordan and A. Lenschow, “Environmental Policy 
Integration: A State of the Art Review”, 2010 
Environmental Policy and Governance 2010, 20 (3), pp. 
147-158.   
77 Not by chance, the most notorious aspect of EU 
environmental policy in this phase remains the actions and 
initiatives in response to climate change, defined in the 7th 
Environment Action Programme.  The three main 
objectives: (1) to protect, conserve and enhance the Union’s 
natural capital; (2) to turn the Union into a resource-
efficient, (3) green, and competitive low-carbon economy; 
(4) to safeguard the Union's citizens from environment-
related pressures and risks to health and wellbeing  
Four so called "enablers" will help Europe deliver on these 
goals.  
DECISION No 1386/2013/EU OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 20 November 2013 on a General Union Environment 
Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of 
our planet’ (Text with EEA relevance), on http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013D1386; see also, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/action-programme/ 
welcomed competence of the EU on Energy and 
the challenges that the secondary legislation on 
Renewable Energy Directive poses creating a 
long list of legal conflicts still unresolved. The 
RES Directive, which is seen as a clue legal 
instrument to undertake a social transformation 
towards clean energy, gives signs of weaknesses 
by rooting its legal basis on environmental 
competences of the EU, not solving the 
problems of a fragmented EU internal energy 
market.  This, of course, puts at risk the whole 
integration process and the integrity of a solid 
Energy market that should aim for one 
important ‘mandatory’ direction: 
“sustainability”. 
 
